REVIEW ESSAY

Right of Center

• • •  Rearranging the Israeli Political Map

Samuel Peleg

Gideon Aran, Kookism [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2013), 464 pp., $107.00 (paperback).


Two personal memories haunted me as I was reading through the three books covered in this essay. The early one was from about three decades ago, while I was a young parliamentary adviser in the Knesset at a time when one of its members was Rabbi Meir Kahane, the lone representative of the far-right Kach party. He was totally isolated and roamed the corridors of the building alone, accompanied only by his loyal aide Baruch Marzel. He dined alone in the Knesset’s cafeteria, and when he gave a speech, the plenary was deserted by all other MKs.

The second memory is from 20 years later, when I was conducting research for my book Zealotry and Vengeance: Quest of a Religious Identity Group (Peleg 2002). I interviewed one of the leaders of Gush Emunim at his home in the West Bank. Sitting in an exquisite balcony overlooking a valley of olive trees, I listened carefully as my interviewee enthusiastically depicted what was at stake and where the real “fault lines” (he later rephrased this expression to “battle lines”) were drawn. “We are not worried about the fate of the territories,” he admitted. “With God’s help, we will prevail, and the Palestinians will no longer be a threat to us.” With his voice lowered to almost a whisper, he added: “The real danger and the real challenge is the Israeli State, the Israeli government, and ultimately,
the Israeli culture—the secular, Westernized, promiscuous Israeli culture.” “With God’s blessing,” my host vowed, “we will change all that.”

These two incidents came alive as I was reading three remarkable accounts of the Israeli radical right, to which both Kahane and Gush Emunim belonged. Gideon Aran’s grand opus about the origins and principles of Gush Emunim, Motti Inbari’s razor sharp depiction of religious messianic fundamentalism, and Ami Pedahzur’s critical analysis of the ascendance of the extreme right in Israeli politics conjointly portray a picture of an incredible political and ideological transformation in a stunningly short time span. The question all three books endeavor to ask is how such a phenomenon could happen and why. More specifically, these works probe into the vexing query concerning the circumstances and eventualities that enabled such key developments.

Chronologically, Aran’s book emphasizes the latter half of the 1970s, the years when Gush Emunim stood at the forefront of the settlement undertaking, whereas Inbari’s emphasis is on the 2005 disengagement policy and the challenges it posed to Religious Zionism and its leadership. Pedahzur presents a contemporary picture of Israeli politics in which the ‘populist radical right’, a description he adopts from Cas Mudde’s (2007) excellent analysis of the European political right, has positioned itself comfortably in the mainstream of Israeli politics to the extent that it has triumphed in its attempt to set the political agenda. Although all three books highlight different historical thresholds and turning points, they all restate the same general proposition: fundamental Zionist theology, messianic Religious Zionism, and the populist radical right in Israel have prevailed and have done so in an extraordinary and striking fashion.

Another similarity all three texts share is that they underscore a long and gradual sequence of development that brought about this major shift in the Israeli ideological and socio-political landscape. Single events, including the inception of the Zionist state, the 1973 War, the Oslo Accords, and the Gaza disengagement, as dramatic and abnormal as they might be, are but catalysts and necessary accelerators; however, they are not solely sufficient to explicate the rearrangement of Israeli political fundamentals. It is an accumulative evolvement of norms, values, and beliefs fanned by ongoing grievances and stimulated by charismatic leaders that ultimately set in motion these tremendous changes.

**Gush Emunim: Its Rise and Legacy**

Aran’s astonishing work, based on his PhD thesis, is a meticulous and painstaking study of Gush Emunim in real time. It reminded me of two
other monumental studies that were researched and published more or less at the same time that Aran was completing his original work. Jillian Becker’s (1977) *Hitler’s Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang* and Todd Gitlin’s (1980) *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* offer, albeit from different angles, detailed analyses of the Red Army Faction in West Germany and the New Left activist movement Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in the United States.

Most literature on political participation in general, and on extra-parliamentarism in particular, especially on social movements, is confined to the deeds and activities of the perpetrators and to the consequences of their operations on the stability of the system. Aran’s scrutiny of Gush Emunim’s internal mechanisms, including the inner factions, divisions, and splinters, is therefore unique and exquisite. Moreover, his work illustrates how the Gush itself was born out of a major internal rift within the Religious Zionist camp and how the crisis was generated by the incompatibility of faith and unfolding reality.

The takeoff of Gush Emunim as a full-fledged activist movement that defied the Israeli government in 1974, following the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, is attributed by Aran to the severance of the duality of messianism and mysticism, which have been the cornerstone of Kookism since its nascent days. Kookism, the title of Aran’s book is the ideology or ethical legacy bequeathed by the spiritual leaders of Religious Zionism—Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook (senior) and his son and successor Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook (junior)—to their disciples. The vital appeal of Kookism was that it provided a formula for Religious Zionists to remain religious believers in a secular nationalist movement and loyal citizens of a secular state. Kookism wove together the ideals of divine redemption and active involvement in the politics and social life of Israel by invoking and meshing two traditional streams within Judaism—messianism and mysticism.

The former was, in its nature, more attuned to the Land of Israel and the specific salvation of the Jewish people, whereas the latter elevated this particularistic struggle to a cosmic one, and the current to eternal. The fatalism and inevitability of mysticism tamed and harnessed the urgency and immediacy of messianism. The more that Religious Zionism became entrenched in the Israeli routine, the weaker the corresponding universalistic, ahistorical proclivities became. Mysticism began to lose its allure among the younger generation of Kookists. And here Aran supplies the ultimate rationale for the eruption of the vigorously militant Gush Emunim: with the psychological shock of the Yom Kippur War and the threat of giving back the territories, the messianic elements of exigency and emergency erupted unmitigated and unbounded by the restraining effect
of mysticism. I think that this is among the most original and thought-provoking parts of this rich volume.

Aran is trying as best as he can to disassociate himself from the protagonists of his book, Gush Emunim’s leaders and activists. He makes a special effort to draw distinctions between the beliefs of the people he interviews and so meticulously describes and his own worldview, ethics, and political stands. However, occasionally within this sturdy volume, he has some slip-ups: subtle, almost imperceptible intimations of fondness toward the subjects of his inquiry. In the beginning of the book, his gratitude is warmly expressed to many of the Gush’s prominent and extremist figures, several of whom were tried and convicted for various assaults, including the killing of Palestinians. In all fairness, it can be understood how one could be caught up, even slightly, in the spell of Gush Emunim, especially when fathoming its essence and its passion, as Aran does.

Historically, it is difficult to recall a social movement that has become so influential and has left such a formidable imprint on the political environment it grew up in. From the narrow and selective perspective of political impact and political success, this is an admirable and almost unprecedented achievement. Gush Emunim’s influence stretches from its humble beginnings in April 1968, when a handful of Seder participants in Hebron decided to “stay the night,” to the present day, when more than half a million Jews live in the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. It transformed itself from a bunch of lawless figures on the margins of the political spectrum into a significant political player, without which no conflict resolution between Israelis and Palestinians, let alone a peace treaty, can be realized. This is an impressive and awe-inspiring record.

Aran’s analysis of the roots of the movement; its religious and ideological premises; the hopes, aspirations, misgivings, hesitations, and crises of its members; and its trajectory from latent passivity to manifest activism is far-reaching and exhaustive, an expression of the time and effort he invested in this project. It is a magnificent documentation of how such a cultural and political manifestation could have emerged in the time and place that it did. Although Aran explains the merits of publishing his manuscript as it was originally written, albeit in a more condensed and coherent form, one of the weaknesses of the book is its lack of an epilogue or current update to juxtapose Gush Emunim at the peak of its political potency with the state of the Israeli political system today.

The heritage of the Gush was carried on by several successor movements and organizations, such as the settlement-construction movement Amana and the Yesha Council, and political parties like the National Religious Party and Moledet. Such a perspective from hindsight could enrich
the reader’s understanding with regard to the long-range impact of the Religious Zionist movement, not only on the Israeli political system, but on Israeli political discourse and the psyche of the country (Peleg 2003).

Inbari’s book takes off from where Aran’s finishes, with the introduction of Kookism as a political theology that incorporates the state, yet utterly rejects its secularism. Zionism is co-opted and subjugated by the messianic mysticism of Kookism, unwittingly becoming a pawn in the overall cosmic design. But this book tests Kookism’s applicability through trials and tribulations that Aran did not examine: the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, the Oslo Accords, and the disengagement from Gaza. All of these political developments posed a major challenge—indeed, a threat—to the viability of the Kookist vision due to the territorial concessions that each entailed and the intensification of the friction between internal bliss and external upheaval. Inbari’s main emphasis is on the growing fissure between Israeli policy-making and messianic Religious Zionism or, as he succinctly terms it, ‘fundamentalism in crisis’.

Taking a primarily elitist perspective, Inbari chooses to reflect this discontent among the ‘true believers’, focusing on prominent rabbis of the movement, conformists, and dissidents while analyzing the rationalization process that each group undergoes. Had he also investigated the internal debate within Religious Zionism through an analysis of the rank and file, that is, the followers and disciples of the spiritual leaders, this would have added an exciting dimension to comprehending the tumult in their midst. The author’s main theoretical basis relies on the concept of cognitive dissonance, according to which a discrepancy between expectations and capabilities generates stress and discomfort. Actors feel a need to eliminate the gap between their cognitive world and the encroaching reality (Beauvois and Joule 1996; Cooper 2007; Festinger 1957; Gawronski and Strack 2012; Gurr 2011). This is an interesting premise to pursue and sheds light on the response of the messianic camp to territorial compromises.

The external stimulus that undermines Kookism is labeled a ‘prophetic failure’, after the classic study of Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter ([1956] 2008), When Prophecy Fails, which was one of the first published case studies to examine the social ramifications of disconfirmed expectations. According to Inbari, there are three possible approaches to counter such prophetic failure with regard to Religious Zionism: (1) acknowledge the failure and abandon messianic expectations; (2) deny the failure and supply an alternative interpretation that sustains the redemptive process; or (3) admit the failure but intensify messianic conduct in order to prevent total calamity and save whatever is salvageable of the vision. The author’s objective, as he expresses it, is “to identify the circumstances that lead to each of these three distinct responses” (9).
But Inbari falls short of his ambitious intentions. He notes the responses of Gush Emunim, the Jewish Leadership Movement, and Chief Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu to the Yom Kippur War, the Oslo Agreement, and the 2005 Gaza disengagement, respectively, as instances of the third approach: they are all examples of ‘hastening the end’ and augmenting resistance to detrimental developments through radicalization. Other prominent leaders in Religious Zionism—Rabbi Yehuda Amital, Rabbi Zvi Tau, Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun, and Rabbi Shlomo Aviner—represent the alternative paths of coping with the crisis. However, the crux of the query remains unsolved: What are the criteria according to which these alternatives are selected? What makes one mode of operation more attractive, and to whom? Individual accounts of specific persons or groups, while historically fascinating, are incapable of supplying a systematic explanation.

**Religion, Politics, and Violence**

There is more to this upsurge of religious vehemence and violence. It is a worldwide phenomenon, as today’s headlines attest, and these two books lack the broader theoretical perspective that could have linked Gush Emunim or the Jewish Leadership group with other revitalized movements representing contending religions and cultures. Their plight, in the face of modernism and secularism, is similar, and all the religious scriptures are rife with violence and blood. But in order to interpret these symbols literally and carry them over to the present day, a process of ‘politicization of religion’ has to occur. This is a power strategy that galvanizes and mobilizes the capacity of religion to inspire and arouse in order to prod political mobilization (Peleg 2012). Religious protagonists operate in the political arena where they seek political goals, utilizing religious terminology and symbols to marshal supporters. The leaders of Gush Emunim or Jewish Leadership exploit messianic visions and images of imminent redemption to entice and incite their followers. Camouflaging political struggles in spiritual and religious garb has been studied as part of the swelling theoretical perspective whereby the politicization of religion is viewed as a means to explain the nexus between faith and violence (cf. Almond et al. 2003; Avalos 2005; Crockett 2006; Gopin 2000; Kepel 1994; Stern 2004; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004).

At the heart of this paradigm lies the age-old cosmic quest for power, disguised as a sacred mission of the pious to stave off the forces of evil (Rapoport 1988). However, in a fascinating reversal of the traditional wisdom, Antoun (2001), Juergensmeyer (2003, 2008), Herriot (2009), IVanescu (2010), and others started emphasizing the opposite association, namely, the ‘religionization of politics’. In this inverted relationship, protagonists
exploit politics to advance and precipitate religious goals. Missionary leaders, avid proselytizers, and campaigning shamans find the political arena propitious for recruiting masses to their religious crusades and holy confrontations. There they use religious language and symbolism to generate images of good versus wickedness, dichotomies of the faithful and the infidel, and the zeal that fuels the eternal cosmic collision between the forces of good and all the rest (Appleby 2000; Gopin 2000; Rapoport 1988; Sprinzak 1986, 1991).

Religionization of politics portrays routine, everyday life in colossal and overblown colors. It renders every disagreement a contention and every challenger an enemy. Political and social controversies become profanities, and every doubter turns heretic. Mundane discrepancies are elevated to celestial clashes, while rebuttal or reservation is shunned as sacrilege. Public debate is dramatic and sensational with omnipresent consequences; accordingly, the protagonists are the devout and their leaders the prophets and the virtuous. Their task is to save the universe from the perpetual nemesis of true believers—the Amalekites and their ilk. The appropriate manner, indeed, the only manner, to face down and obliterate the wicked is in merciless all-out combat, a moral and righteous war, a battle of salvation and purification upon which hinges the destiny of the human race.

Such zealotry permeates every walk of life and blurs the boundaries between the public and the private. As it expands and intensifies, it becomes the ‘religionization of life’, not merely politics. Once religionized life and reality contradict one another, trouble develops. The incongruity between the ‘law of God’ (natural law) and the ‘law of the land’ (positive law) was one of the major issues that prompted the Gush Emunim militants into action. They regarded the secular law as temporary and expedient until it collided with their faith. Then it had to be transgressed.

This is of global significance because modernity, secularism, globalization, immigration, refugees, hunger, and other social, economic, and political vagaries know no borders. In the modern and postmodern age, discourse and dialogue have become much more pertinent than ever before in human existence. A myriad of identities and affiliations in increasingly crowded societies collide and generate multiple frictions and hostilities. In The Sacred Canopy, sociologist Peter Berger ([1967] 2011) depicts such emergent vulnerability in his analysis of modernity’s influence on religion and morale. He sums up the resulting inevitable conflict as friction between people with different values, ideologies, and lifestyles who find themselves living in close proximity and thus are forced to relate to one another in one of two manners: collide or accommodate.

This newly formed pluralism has yielded two polar approaches toward diversity and otherness: relativism, the conviction that all is relative and
qualified, dependent on changing circumstances and contingencies, and fanaticism, the quest for permanency and the pursuit of solid assurances to ward off unknown challenges, in reaction to relativism. These two approaches, despite their obviously opposite natures, resemble each other in their disdain for, and lack of consideration of dialogue among, factions in society. Postmodern relativists and reactionary fundamentalists alike abhor reaching out to others and despise integrative build-up of communities because they do not believe in such an effort. Not interfering with the agenda of others or persecuting them for it are two disparate motivations that lead to the same place.

A decade later, in *The Heretical Imperatives*, Berger (1979) admonishes that plurality of thought undermines the monistic authority of orthodoxy and challenges the validity of its mores. Under these dire circumstances, there are three options for the guardians of faith: (1) the reaffirmation of tradition in defiance of change; (2) the secularization of religion in acceptance of change; or (3) the careful and prudent adjustment of tradition to meet the challenges of the time. Berger vehemently supports the third option, which he calls ‘the inductive possibility’, as the best way to combat the ‘heretical imperative’ of modernity (ibid.: 95–127).

This alternative is described as inductive because the justifications and explanations for being religious are ‘aggregated’ and argued from experience by re-examining basic questions (Berger 1979). This trial-and-error procedure reconciles the abiding precepts of faith with the inconstant social environment. It takes prudent and discerning spiritual leaders to forgo some of their basic convictions for the good of their people. In the same vein, Pipes (1983) introduces the term ‘medieval synthesis’ to denote the policy compromise that Muslim leaders formulated between the religious Shari’a law and changing human realities. This blend has come to be known as ‘traditionalist Islam’, as opposed to strict and ruthless fundamentalism. The synthesis worked well as “an immensely stable and attractive combination of ideal goals and pragmatic actions which held in several continents and over many centuries” (ibid.: 57). Both inductive possibility and medieval synthesis are under tremendous strain today, as reality becomes more convoluted and less comprehensible via the omnipotent mechanisms of faith.

---

**From Right to Center**

In his book, Pedahzur attempts to expand the cultural and political framework of the radical right beyond the messianic religious camp and the religious-secular divide that his two counterparts describe. In his convincing
and revealing narrative of the roots, motivations, and reasons for the success of the radical right in Israel, he begins by exploring the meaning of ‘extreme right wing’ in general and then examines it within the context of Israeli politics in order to extend this notion beyond the exclusive niche of militant Religious Zionism. In the course of this probe, the author discovers that the origins of Israeli radical politics are to be found in Yishuv days, the pre-state era, during which the political system of the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine, along with the political culture around it, took form. Unlike the other two authors, Pedahzur maintains that the ethos of zealotry and defiance was already embedded in political conduct regardless of the religious-secular tensions or the territories versus peace schism after the 1967 War.

The author traces this proclivity to one of the three fundamental tenets of the populist radical right, that is, nativism, the other two being authoritarianism and populism. Nativism is the political philosophy and aspiration of having a perfect congruity between state and nation, or between the native group of the land and the territory and sovereignty that the state epitomizes. This idea advances the literal interpretation of the term ‘nation-state’. In the context of Israeli politics, nativism spelled “the complete integration of the Jewish nation and the State of Israel,” creating conditions that “institutionalized a preferred status of the Jewish majority” (33). This discriminatory basis for the incipient state achieved consensus status among all Zionist political parties and laid the psychological and moral foundations for a taken-for-granted attitude of entitlement and exclusion toward non-Zionists minorities in the Israeli body politic.

This sense of prerogative and privilege was so prevalent among Israeli Jews that, gradually but surely, it won over the political discourse and ended all pretense of universalism, equality, and fairness toward others. It also explains how the radical right, in Pedahzur’s words, ‘triumphed’: apparently, it did not have too many obstacles to overcome when the basic ethos of hegemony and supremacy was already safely infused within the Zionist DNA.

The nativist premise of the state-to-be was predicated on, and coalesced effortlessly with, the other two elements of extremism: authoritarianism and populism. These two lay dormant for the first two decades of Israeli independence, during which the government assumed authority over all the citizens, and the existential problems it dealt with were so overwhelming that no constituency had the audacity or the resolve to blatantly challenge the state. Discontent was festering and simmering among several groups who felt deprived vis-à-vis the elites but not yet to the point where populism could take hold and become a political slogan. The 1967 War, the watershed for a multitude of socio-political changes in Israel, awakened
the quest for a different kind of authority and unleashed populism against those at the helm.

Similar to what Aran and Inbari describe, Pedahzur relates how messianism and mysticism were vigorously propelled into the mindset of the young generation of Religious Zionists. Their docile acquiescence with the secular and modern state was rattled to the core by what they perceived as divine intervention, arriving to compensate for the indecisive government of non-believers. This ecstatic hope and euphoric anticipation were supplanted by bitter disappointment and profound anxiety seven years later due to the Yom Kippur War and its aftermath. Suddenly, to their inconceivable dismay, the revitalized Religious Zionists thought that they were facing the imminent catastrophe of giving back territory. One of the immediate reactions that came with the establishment of Gush Emunim, and later with other groups, was the desire for a new type of authority, an omnipotent and invincible one, which would enable religious authority and the primacy of Jewish law to take over the state and render it a theocracy.

Populism surged as well. The authority vacuum and decision-making deficiencies that were so flagrantly exposed in the Yom Kippur War debacle released a plethora of hostility and frustration that had hitherto been compliantly restrained by underprivileged populations. With the encouragement of the political opposition, which recognized a golden opportunity for a historic change, disadvantaged populations such as Sephardic Jews and Religious Zionists became susceptible and receptive to political messages depicting the Labor government and the social, economic, cultural, and educational elites of its power base as detached from the ‘real people’. These developments rearranged the Israeli political map, pitting the aloof and detached left against the caring and embracing right, the rulers against the ruled, and the universalists, who were ready to relinquish the heart of the homeland, against the loyal protectors of Jewish heritage.

The convergence of the yearning for theocratic authority and the emergent empowerment of populism with the already established root of nativism set a solid basis for the populist radical right to gradually take over. It was not only a political transformation, but a cultural, psychological, and normative one as well. The populist radical right’s perspective became a worldview, a way of life that dictated attitudes toward the ‘Other’, any other: the secular, the liberal, the intellectual, the Arab, the Palestinian, the non-Jew—in short, anyone who did not fit and could not belong on the fundamental platform of the nativist Jewish hegemony. This was a broader common denominator, which swelled the scope of the Israeli radical right beyond messianic Religious Zionists to incorporate non-religious elements on one side and more normatively Orthodox elements on the other. The Whole Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael Ha’sh’laymah) movement
sprang out of the activist wing of the Labor Party in the aftermath of the Six-Day War in 1967, and some of the most vehement leaders of the settlers’ movement were avidly secular. Among the Orthodox Jewish communities, a radicalization process was also noticeable after 1967, and a shift from political indifference toward right-wing militancy was accelerated after the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

The Shas party, which was founded in the early 1980s, drew its support from disenfranchised Orthodox and Mizrahi followers, who were overwhelmingly right-wing. By the early 1990s, with the huge waves of immigration from the crumbling Soviet Union, Russian Jews amplified the repository of radical-right voters. They were not religious, largely even anti-religious, but many have found a hospitable home under right-wing auspices since they are anti-establishment and anti-Arab as well. The Yisrael Beiteinu party, like Shas, has made a political fortune by recognizing these proclivities among its core constituency.

Pedahzur’s analysis is powerful and comprehensive, but I believe it would have benefited from an additional dimension—that of political culture. Political culture, defined as “the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system” (Freeman 1986: 328), interjects a new rationale for the ostensible shift of the Israeli political map to the right. A complementary way to comprehend the political process is to adopt the framework of the ‘ecological triad’, coined by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1968) to demarcate the intrinsic balance between the agent (or actor), the environment in which actors interact, and the relationship between the actors and their environment. These three elements interact to the extent that “any substantial change in one sector of the milieu is nearly certain to produce significant, often unsettling, sometimes utterly destructive, consequences in other sectors” (ibid.: 55).

If the environment or milieu—that is, the historical, cultural, psychological, and mental conditions and circumstances in which the Israeli political system arose and operated—is brought into the analysis, the emphases change. If contextual variables, such as colonialism, nationalism, ethnicity, the Cold War, or the Zionist Zeitgeist (Dowty 2004; Kimmerling 2005), are introduced into the equation, the ascendancy of the radical right can be perceived as a natural, inexorable, and unavoidable upshot of Zionist ideology. According to this logic, the term ‘right wing’, which is relative and relational to begin with, is superfluous because there was never an authentic left in Israeli politics with which to contrast it, let alone to contest it.

Mapai—the mainstream and dominant party until 1977—and the Labor movement that it represented were always more nationalistic than
socialistic (Aronoff 1993; Cohen 1992; Garfinkle 2000; Sharkansky 2005; Sternhell 2009). Hence, the political earthquake following the Yom Kippur War was more about the changing of the political guard rather than the ideological guard. Nativist sentiments (and policies) were enthusiastically embraced by both right and left, who equally pursued the build-up of settlements (albeit with differing excuses and explanations) and equally sought to maintain and preserve Jewish hegemony in every aspect of public life in Israel (Smooha 1989). From this broader perspective, the comfortable positioning of the radical right in the center of the political map and the seamless adjustment of the political discourse to a nativist-populist agenda should not have surprised anyone. Ideas and hopes that once were whispered in remote corners are now brazenly discussed in the Knesset’s plenary and committees. The aversion to Kahane’s racism decades ago was based more on the tone and style of the man than on the essence of his ideology. Were he alive today, Kahane would not be meandering the corridors of Parliament on his own.

SAMUEL PELEG specializes in conflict analysis and conflict resolution, negotiation, decision-making, leadership, and intercultural/interorganizational communication. He is the Rutgers University Political Science Department’s Director of Development for the newly established MA Program in UN and Global Policy Studies, as well as the Director of the Rutgers University-Ritsumeikan University (Kyoto) Exchange Program.

REFERENCES


